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August 2009
THE ROLE OF CUBAN PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
(PEOPLE’S MILITIAS) IN THE POST-CASTRO ERA
Max G. Manwaring
U.S. Army War College
Armed nonstate groups all over the world are directly challenging targeted
governments’ physical and moral right and ability to govern. This almost chronic chaos
is exacerbated by traditional nationstate actors using nonstate popular militias, youth
leagues, gangs, or their equivalents to help the take control, maintain control, or regain
control of a given political-economic-social entity. It is in this context that popular
militias have been organized, trained, and nurtured in Cuba. For 50 years, Cuba’s popular militias (paramilitary organizations) have been expected to act as “midwifes for new
social orders” (as they did in Africa during the 1960s and early 1970s), and to help
defend and maintain the revolutionary Socialist state. Anyone contemplating the postCastro Era in Cuba will certainly have to take these paramilitary organizations into
consideration.
Background: The Cuban Armed Forces and Paramilitary Forces.
The regular (conventional) Cuban armed forces (FAR, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias) have recently been reduced in size and now consist of 49,000 active duty
personnel and over one million reserves. These forces are conventionally divided into
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and are under the political control of the Minister of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR). The paramilitary forces consist of 26,500
personnel, and are divided between the Youth Labor Army (EJT, Ejercito Juvinil), the
Territorial Militias (MTTs, Milicias de Tropas Territoriales), and the Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution (CDR, Commites de Defensa de la Revolucion). These
paramilitary organizations fall under the political control of the Minister of the Interior
(MININT). The intent of such a division of labor is to create multiple security
organizations that are ultimately responsible to the Supreme Leader of the state through
the MINFAR and the MININT. As such, and under their respective immediate political
masters (depending on who they might be in a socialist succession or a democratic
transition), they theoretically act as counterfoils to each other. At the same time, this
division of labor is intended to ensure that the Supreme Leader of the Cuban state
cannot be challenged by a single all-powerful military entity. Thus, legally and

organizationally, the Leader (whoever he may be) maintains and controls a complete
monopoly of state power.
The FAR is structured, trained, and located to accomplish two missions: (1) the
conventional defense of Cuba against U.S. aggression; and (2) to provide internal
security. The paramilitary forces (EJT, MTT, and CDR) are organized and trained to
provide strategic depth from which to regain control of the country if attacked by an
external aggressor. In that connection, the paramilitaries are also prepared to fight a
Guerra de todo el Pueblo (Guerrilla, or Peoples’ War), in the event of conventional defeat
by an external aggressor. Thus, even if the FAR should be defeated by an enemy force,
the paramilitaries would be in a position to continue the fight to defend and/or to
reestablish the threatened Socialist state.
Accordingly, training, doctrine, and inculcation of a revolutionary culture in the
Cuban paramilitaries preclude the concept of a new and different (e.g., liberal democracy) type of government, and/or the dissolution of the current security apparatus.
That is, there will be either no change in succession to another socialist government or
there will be a period of political chaos in transition to a new and different type of
government. Theoretically, it is expected that that chaos will be similar to that
experienced in Russia after the Revolution of 1917 and before the consolidation of
power by V. I. Lenin. This takes us to a further elaboration of the expected role of
paramilitaries in Cuba after the end of the Castro Era.
Elaborating the Role of the Cuban Paramilitaries in the Event of a Post-Castro Period
of Political-Economic-Social-Informational-Military Turmoil.
Left in dire straits, subject to depredation, and denied adequate and legitimate
access to basic services and personal security, people become susceptible to the
exhortations of demagogues, hate-mongerers, revolutionary reformers, transnational
criminals, and other individuals who might want to take control of the state. The
concomitant turmoil can allow peoples’ militias (paramilitary organizations) to operate
with relative freedom of movement and action. In these terms, conflict and adversaries
will have changed. Conflict will no longer only be an instrument of state action, but also
of nonstate engagement. As a result, the adversary (and, center of gravity) will no
longer only be a recognizable military force and a nation state’s industrial-technical
capability to support military operations. Rather, new adversaries will include nonstate
actors and their various allies who can influence and control public opinion and
political decisionmaking leadership. The basic reality of this new center of gravity is
that information and the media—not military firepower or technology—is the primary
currency upon which a People’s War is conducted.
In this type of security environment, the general purpose of popular militias is to
raise the level of direct popular action against “indigenous feudalism, aboriginal
capitalism, sepoyan militarism, and yanqui imperialism.” The intent is not to destroy an
enemy military force. The objective of the paramilitary effort is—with popular support-to wear down the enemy government and people to the point where their resolve is
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dead. There is no need for a formal army. There are no maneuver forces, no design for
conventional battle, and no obvious connectivity with other paramilitary actions elsewhere. Each engagement is particular to itself, but connected together through a system
of networks and an overarching political idea—to depose an enemy regime and provide
the leadership to reestablish a revolutionary Socialist state. Thus, “Political and moral
factors are more decisive for victory than heavy armament and ironclad units.”
More specifically, the paramilitary organizations will accomplish their objectives
over time, and in a minimum of seven phases. They will:
Organize and train cadres of professionals for political leadership duties, politicalpsychological-military combat, and the creation of selected environments of chaos;
Create a popular political party out of individuals of all persuasions who will work
together to disestablish opposed societies and establish a new social democracy;
Plan and execute covert and overt persuasion, intimidation, and coercion activities
against targeted individuals and institutions;
Organize, train, and develop local popular militias to fight and to defend their own
localities;
Foment regional conflicts;
Confront—gradually—demoralized enemy military forces, and act as a catalyst to
bring about their desired collapse; and,
Impose or reestablish new Socialist governance.
This is not the rhetoric of a disappointed old man who will never see his revolutionary
dreams fulfilled. Rather, this is the rhetoric of an individual that is performing the
traditional and universal Leninist-Maoist function of providing a strategic vision and an
operational plan for maintaining or regaining revolutionary power.
Conclusion and Recommendation.
The security environment in the Post-Castro Era can either remain quite stable, or
become extremely volatile and dangerous. In either case, Cuba’s paramilitary
organizations will require careful attention.
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